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 Egoism and the Return 
of Charitable Gifts 
 JOHN  PICTON  *  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE LAW ASSUMES that all donors to charities are altruistic, when they are not. It assumes that all donors care about the charitable ends to which they give their money, when they do not. In consequence of the law ’ s miscon-
ception, judges sometimes proceed to return gifts without a sound legal rationale 
for doing so. It is argued that where gifts fail, the legal basis of return is that, in 
analogy with frustrated consumers who have paid for unobtainable goods, donors 
should get their money back. With reference to altruism and egoism as the concepts 
are understood in economic donative theory, 1 it will be seen that this legal logic is 
only pertinent in relation to individuals who genuinely care about the delivery of 
charitable outcomes. 
 The law has a blind spot in relation to egoistic intent. Such individuals donate 
for a personal satisfaction which is entirely removed from the achievement of any 
other-regarding charitable outcome. 2 If they are purely egoistic, these donors cannot 
be frustrated where gifts fail. End goals are unimportant to them. They had their 
satisfaction at the point of donation when they consumed a joy-of-giving. 3 They are 
not frustrated, so they are outside the rationale of return. 
 It is in diffi cult cases — failure cases — that judicial understandings of donor moti-
vation come to the fore. In the normal course, when donors part with their money, 
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their gifts fl ow up a legal pipeline and into the lives of others without any cause for 
an analysis of the donor ’ s wishes. In ordinary cases, the law channels, but does not 
query too deeply, the motivation behind the gift. But where the pipeline fractures 
because the donor ’ s instructions prove impossible to effect, the law is put to much 
heavier work. It is at this pressure point of failure, where, for example, a donor has 
left insuffi cient funds, 4 a trustee disclaims 5 or a nominated charity has closed down, 6 
that the law, which attempts to effect what the donor would have  subjectively 
wished, 7 leaks its assumptions about the nature of the donor ’ s motivation. 
 Critical economic analysis of the law ’ s understanding of donor motivation marks 
a fresh line of enquiry. While economics and charity law have in recent times 
formed a fruitful critical pairing, 8 contemporary economic enquiry turns mostly 
upon issues of broad political economy: that is, charity ’ s role within the so-called 
third sector between state and market. 9 Individual-level economic understandings 
of donor motivation have been left more or less untouched in legal scholarship. On 
the very rare occasions where micro-level economic concepts are applied to law, 
the focus has been on the impact of the law upon overall distributions of charitable 
wealth. 10 
 This chapter departs from previous  ‘ public ’ economic approaches, using micro-
level concepts (economic altruism and economic egoism) to critique the courts ’ 
understanding of individual minds. This enables a fresh conceptual claim: that the 
rationale for return is based in frustrated economic altruism. 11 Building on that 
claim, it is further argued that where gifts are driven by unalloyed egoism, judges —
 unable to recognise the fact — sometimes return gifts without cause. The application 
of donative economic theory will therefore both reveal the altruistic basis of the 
law of return and also problematise the law ’ s treatment of egoistic gifts outside that 
altruistic rationale. Most broadly, it will throw up deep-seated and hitherto unexam-
ined legal assumptions about donative intent. 
 On an original view within economic donative theory, donors are modelled as 
altruistic. 12 Altruism in this context has a meaning more focused than the ordinary 
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use of the word. Altruistic donors, in the economic sense, are minded to give because 
they derive satisfaction from the consumption of others. 13 They care about the chari-
table ends to which their gifts are applied. In  Strangers Drowning , 14 MacFarquhar 
describes the lived experience of individuals she calls  ‘ do-gooders ’ . 15 One of these, 
Julia Wise, matches altruism in the economic sense. Described as both rational and 
ardent, 16 she gives as much of her income away to charity as she can, leaving the 
minimum possible for her own restricted life. However, it is her motivation rather 
than her resulting penury which is important. She gives out of a concern to materi-
ally better the lives of others. She funds cost-effective medical interventions in low-
income countries. Crucially, she is motivated only by material outcomes; economic 
results that benefi t others. She gets no egoistic glow; only the ends matter. 
 Alongside altruism, in more recent times, donative economic theory has developed 
a complementary type of motivation — egoism, or the consumption of joy-of- giving. 17 
It is central to the concept that an entirely egoistic donor is unconcerned with chari-
table outcomes. That is, she might happen to give to charity, but she will not care 
whether other people consume the charitable goods she incidentally  provides. Her 
motivation does not lie in the material advantage of other people.  Beveridge, in 
 Voluntary Action , 18 a post-war report on the charitable sector, detailed the case of 
George Jarvis, who had been a man of substantial property in  Herefordshire and 
who almost perfectly represents pure charitable egoism in this economic sense. 19 
George Jarvis ’ s neighbours reported that no intention to make a gift to charity 
had ever entered his mind until he became displeased with his daughter ’ s choice of 
husband. Beveridge writes that  ‘ he lived to see her become a mother and grand-
mother, but nursed his resentment to the end ’ . 20 Out of apparent spite to his daughter, 
upon his death, he established a charity for the relief of the poor, so as to disinherit 
her. George Jarvis can be described as an egoistic donor in the economic sense. In 
contrast to Julia Wise, the charitable outcome of his gift was unimportant. He was 
entirely indifferent whether poverty was in fact alleviated, he just wanted to spite his 
daughter. He was motivated by a joy-of-giving, albeit of a malign type. 
 The altruistic motivation of Julia Wise comes to us more readily than the purely 
egoistic intent of George Jarvis. We more naturally associate outcome-driven altru-
ism with charitable giving. However, economic egoism, where the charitable goods 
supplied by the donor are incidental to the motivation behind the gift, does occur 
in a familiar modern context; it is often deliberately induced in circumstances of 
professionally organised fund-raising drives. 21 So, for example, in  Serpentine Trust 
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Limited v HMRC , 22 a set of inducements made by an art gallery, including inter 
alia opportunities for private hire, priority booking and free invitations to events, 
were held to be so vital in attracting donations as to be classed as transfers for 
consideration. 23 For any donors induced by these fi nancial benefi ts alone, the chari-
table ends to which their money would be applied will have been entirely incidental 
to their motivation to give. They will have been egoistic consumers, unconcerned 
with the cultural cause. 
 First, I begin by acknowledging both the contribution and the limitations of this 
micro-level economic framework. Secondly, the altruistic basis of the law is uncov-
ered. This builds into a claim that the rationale for return is found in frustrated 
altruism. Thirdly, I assess return in the context of purely egoistic giving. It is argued 
that, at the level of legal principle, egoistic gifts should always be kept in charity. 
Fourthly, moving to an applied precedential analysis of the theory, I then argue that 
the courts return egoistic gifts without any coherent doctrinal reason for doing so. 
Finally, equipped with a theoretical vantage point, I argue that attempted statutory 
reform in the context of public appeals suffers for want of clear theory. 
 II. THE LIMITS AND CONTRIBUTION 
OF A BINARY FRAMEWORK 
 Economic donative theory lends the analysis a particular view of donor motiva-
tion. In turn, it becomes possible to match that view with the existing law of return 
and so criticise the courts for their egoistic blind spot. It is important to note that 
donative theory builds on the voluntary nature of charity, emphasising that donors 
make choices according to their motivational preferences. 24 Yet it supplies only a 
binary framework of egoism and altruism. Every charitable impulse is slotted within 
two poles. 
 It is necessary to acknowledge the limits of the binary and to explain why, despite 
those limits, the framework is relevant to legal argument. In consequence of its 
 double-edged nature, economic donative theory cannot provide us with a full-fl eshed 
understanding of charity in complex society. It can tell us that donors might derive 
egoism-based or altruism-based satisfaction, but it cannot tell us why. Notably, the 
binary cannot explain why some of us might be compelled to take great risks for 
others, or why we might care so much that we have the capacity to take those risks. 
Monroe claims, with reference to risk-takers,  ‘ that altruists simply have a differ-
ent way of seeing things. Where the rest of us see a stranger, altruists see a human 
being. ’ 25 By its nature, the altruistic/egoistic binary is too formalistic to fully explain 
why some of us are Good Samaritans. 26 
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 But economic donative theory can make an important critical contribution to 
legal analysis, not least because the altruistic side of the binary so closely matches 
judges ’ own views of donors. In this chapter, the binary will be put to an analytical 
use: as a heuristic, it will help to unlock and then critique the courts ’ framework of 
return. Weaved throughout this chapter, it will be seen from the luxuriously detailed 
individual analyses of gifts made by judges that courts see charitable motivation as 
altruistically outcome-driven in the economic sense. And, most importantly, the con-
cept of self-interested, ego-driven donation provides a new tool with which we can 
assess the law ’ s basic assumptions. The economic framework is a methodological 
trowel for digging up and then critiquing the courts ’ own concepts. 
 III. THE LAW OF RETURN AND FRUSTRATED ALTRUISM 
 It is argued that the rationale for return fl ows from a judicial view of donors as 
altruist consumers. First, it is seen that donors are treated in law as being motivated 
by the achievement of altruistic outcomes, or, put another way, the delivery of chari-
table goods. Secondly, it is argued that judges divide between types of altruist. The 
law only returns to irredeemably frustrated altruists, termed as having a  ‘ particular 
charitable intention ’ 27 at law. 
 A. Donors are Assumed to be Economic Altruists 
 Roberts defi nes altruism in charity as  ‘ the case where the level of consumption of one 
individual enters the utility function of the other ’ . 28 Economic altruism is therefore 
the motivation to expend on the consumption of other people. This is a commonplace 
in our lives. We routinely give towards the material advantage of others. Crucially, 
such altruistic material impulse is outcome-orientated: we want to see something 
consumed by another person when we give. Culyer states, in the context of health-
care provision, that  ‘ It is possible to model altruism in utilitarian terms  … in a health 
context, one is, perhaps, pleased to see another person healthier or with greater 
access to health care than would otherwise be the case ’ . 29 
 An altruistic donor in a health context genuinely wants to see better health care 
delivered as a charitable good that others might consume. 30 Rutherford describes 
the theory as  ‘ charity as caring about the ends ’ . 31 The key point is the focus on 
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outcomes. So one way of understanding economic altruism is simply to say that 
the donor genuinely cares about her stated charitable objectives. For example, it is 
well known that Andrew Carnegie put much of his great industrial wealth towards 
the provision of public libraries. 32 For him to be classifi able as an economic altru-
ist, it is suffi cient that he was genuinely concerned to provide that charitable good 
for the consumption of others, and equally, that his true motivation was not 
a purely egoistic legacy. In that case, he would have been motivated only by the 
joy-of-giving. 
 Genuine concern with outcomes is the key to economic altruism. The mesh with 
legal charity is clear, as the law provides a catalogue of contexts in which expendi-
ture on outcomes benefi ting others is recognised. This is an ancient function of the 
law. The Preamble to the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, from which the modern 
law developed, 33 contains a brochure of broad material ends to which charitable 
funds might be validly applied. Of the lengthy list, many items remain familiar, such 
as the relief of aged, impotent and poor people, and the supportation, aid and help 
of young tradesmen. A more modern list is found in sub-section 3(1) of the Charities 
Act 2011, encompassing, in updated language, much of the historic law 34 and 
adding contemporary concerns such as the advancement of amateur sport 35 and the 
welfare of animals. 36 
 The courts make the intuitive assumption that when donors give towards one 
of these charitable outcomes, they do so because they genuinely care about the 
consumption of others. The charitable pipeline is seen as altruistic plumbing to 
deliver an intended economic advantage to other people. The best evidence for 
this is the framework of frustrated outcomes and consequent return detailed in the 
next  section. However, there is another clue: common law judicial deference to the 
donor ’ s planned outcomes. 
 At common law, judges have proclaimed themselves bound to carry through the 
donor ’ s most precise schemes, and equally bound to refrain from subverting them. 
This is most apparent in circumstances where donors have made workable but 
low-utility gifts and the courts have been called upon to reshape them into something 
more socially worthwhile. At common law, 37 the courts have refused to do so. Or, 
in the words of Sir John Romilly in  Philpott v Saint George ’ s Hospital ,  ‘ instances of 
charities of the most useless description have come before the Court, but which it 
has considered itself bound to carry into effect ’ . 38 
 The judge does not pass comment; she simply effects the donor ’ s wishes. It is 
therefore a matter of logic that the donor is thought to care about outcomes. So, in 
 Philpott , Romilly MR continued to say that he would not speculate upon whether 
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 ‘ a different mode of application of the funds in charity should have occurred to 
the mind of the testator ’ . 39 The same sentiment can be found in  Re University of 
London Medical Sciences Fund , Williams LJ saying that  ‘ the Courts [have never] 
thought it right to be benevolent with a testator ’ s money contrary to the plain 
intention of the will ’ . 40 Again, in  Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Forde , 
Wilson J clearly articulated his respect for original donative intention, stating that he 
had  ‘ always understood that the law was that a testator could leave his property by 
will to whomsoever he liked  … the duty of the court was simply to read the will ’ . 41 
 Donors are assumed to be motivated by their stated plans. This is expressed by 
judicial deference to the donor ’ s chosen charitable goal, even where it is low util-
ity. This fl ows as a matter of logic from an assumption that the judge is genuinely 
committed to its delivery. Courts envisage a limited role for themselves: they effect and 
protect the donor ’ s wishes, and they proclaim themselves resistant to any temptation 
to subvert her plans. An assumption of economic altruism is central to this judicial 
attitude; there would be no need to show such deference to a charitable end goal if it 
was thought that the donor did not truly care about its effectuation. 
 B. Return is for Irredeemably Frustrated Altruists 
 The clearest evidence of a judicial assumption of economic altruism is found in 
the relationship between frustration and return. Donors are considered genuinely 
motivated by the provision of charitable goods — material outcomes — for others. 
This leads to a micro-level economic understanding of the judicial rationale for 
return: where a gift fails, a donor will get it back because her outcomes are found 
to be frustrated. 
 The relationship between frustrated altruism and return is a complex one. Return 
is not automatic for every frustrated donor. The courts have attempted to classify 
their altruists into types: those who are irredeemably frustrated by failure and those 
whose frustration can be relieved by a judicial tonic. Upon a failure, only the truly 
frustrated will get a return. This is because, over a long period, 42 judges have taken 
the view that some donors who have made failed gifts would, in fact, prefer for 
them to be modifi ed and kept in charity on new terms. 43 These donors, for whom 
frustration is thought redeemable, are described as having a general charitable 
intention. 
 Re Royce provides an example of the courts ’ approach to redeemable frustration 
and general intention. In the case, a gift was left to the vicar and churchwardens of 
Oakham Church for the benefi t of the choir. The amount left was far in excess of 
anything that the choir needed, so the surplus sum was held to have failed. In order 
to prevent a return, Simonds J found a very general intention for the advancement of 
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religion behind the gift. He stated that  ‘ The charitable intention (and I use the word 
 “ charitable ” in its legal sense) in giving money for the purpose of musical services in 
a church is for the advancement of religion ’ . 44 
 The donor was thought to have a type of intention which would license the courts 
to fi x the failure, apply it to general religion and so keep the gift in charity. This 
precedential creation is an economically altruistic state of mind. A generally minded 
donor, such as found in  Royce , is thought to be fl exible, but still genuinely com-
mitted to the delivery of charitable goods for the consumption of others. The logic 
of the courts is, in essence, that her altruistic intention was so broad — in  Royce , as 
broad as general religious consumption by humankind — that modifi cation to keep 
the gift in charity would not frustrate her wishes. 
 A second class of donors, those with a so-called particular charitable intention, 45 
comprises donors thought so irredeemably frustrated by the failure that nothing 
can be done for them. They are deemed to have been motivated only by a more 
specialised and unfi xable charitable goal, causing the gift to be returned. To this end, 
Buckley J stated in  Re Lysaght that  ‘ a particular charitable intention exists where the 
donor means his charitable disposition to take effect if, but only if, it can be carried 
into effect in a particular specifi ed way ’ . 46 
 The best-known example of this narrow and return-causing intention is  Re Wilson , 47 
where restrictions and conditions attached to a gift were so detailed as to present 
a picture of a donor wedded to specifi cs and details. The testator, a vicar from 
Cumberland, had sought to establish a school. His will outlined a personal charitable 
vision; the school and a schoolmaster ’ s house were to be paid for by the voluntary 
subscription of landowners and proprietors in specifi ed parishes. The schoolmaster 
was to teach Latin, Greek and the elementary parts of mathematics to a timetable; 
scholars were to go free, but the cost for other pupils was to be 2s 6d at Midsummer 
and a quarter penny at Christmas. Faced with evidence of tightly particular out-
comes, the court thought the failure irredeemable and so effected a return. 
 Crucially, the particular charitable intention — as developed by judges — is altruis-
tic in the economic sense. It is perhaps true that the milk of material human kindness 
runs a little less fully in a donor with only a narrow and infl exible goal in mind, but 
this conception of intention still marks a gift motivated by the economic benefi t of 
other people, so it is materially altruistic. The donor is thought to be driven by the 
delivery of charitable outcomes, albeit outcomes so infl exible and precise as to be 
irredeemable by the court through a process of judicial modifi cation. 
 So, in an intention case, the court merely selects between two types of economic 
altruism, effecting a return where irredeemable frustration is found. The claim that 
the rationale for return rests in frustrated economic altruism is a layered one. Return 
is not automatic. Only the irredeemably frustrated get their money back. However, 
there is a clear conceptual point in play. The linked ideas of irredeemable frustration 
and return depend upon an assumption of economic altruism. It is only possible 
for donors who genuinely care about the delivery of charitable goods to others to 
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suffer frustration. An egoistic donor, who gives without thought or concern for the 
material benefi t of others, will not be frustrated if such others do not receive it. 
 IV. THE EGOISTIC MOTIVATION 
 English judges have not taken a course in economic altruism. Nevertheless, an 
apparently intuitive understanding of economic altruism has been seen to underpin 
the law of return. The rationale for return is that where a donor ’ s assumedly altru-
istic charitable outcome is irredeemably frustrated, she should get her money back. 
 An analysis in donative economics has led the argument to this point, but the 
methodological trowel can dig further still. Since the 1980s, donative economists 
have developed in egoistic consumption a complementary model of motivation based 
in self-interest. It posits that some donors give out of a desire for a self-interested 
joy-of-giving. The altruistic rationale for return, uncovered in the preceding section, 
cannot apply to them. Such donors give without concern for charitable outcomes. 
They give in consumption of a joy-in-giving and are indifferent to other-regarding 
charitable goods. In consequence, they are indifferent whether or not other people 
materially benefi t from their gift, and so its failure does not frustrate them. First, the 
theoretical challenge posed by economic egoism to altruism will be analysed, then it 
will be argued that egoistic gifts are outside the legal rationale of return. 
 A. Economic Egoism and Charitable Gifts 
 Economic egoism is the 1980s child of its altruistic parent. 48 Within the literature, 49 
egoistic motivation has been developed to provide an alternative aspect to the donor 
drive. Importantly, a purely egoistic donor will not be frustrated if certain charita-
ble ends are not delivered. Her motivation is not charitable. The charitable end is 
incidental to her intent. She gives only because it is enjoyable to do so and without 
concern that any charitable plan is realised. 
 A theory of egoistic motivation developed from a testable empirical fl aw in altru-
istic models, so causing the emergence of an alter ego to altruism. 50 It arose because 
goal-regarding motivation suffers from a free-rider problem. That is, if donors are 
modelled as deriving satisfaction from the delivery of charitable goods, they will 
have no motivation to give in circumstances where other hearts are willing to pro-
vide. 51 All they care about is that the goals are met by someone, not necessarily 
themselves. 
 That testable hypothesis has been found wanting. 52 There is no large-scale 
free riding; individuals give to charity even in the presence of contributions from 
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other donors. Egoism emerged as a theoretical response to that donation behav-
iour. In place of caring altruistically about charitable outcomes, it theorises that 
some donors give because they enjoy it. A new consumable good — often termed 
 ‘ glow ’ 53 — is brought into the donor ’ s thought processes. Kotzebue describes the 
donor ’ s motivation as  ‘ driven by the (essentially egoistic) wish to consume a purely 
private good ’ . 54 Thus egoistic motivation adds a new element to donative theory, 
located in the familiar economic terrain of self-interest. Boulding graphically illus-
trates the point:  ‘ If we drop a dime in the blind man ’ s cup, it is because the blind man 
gives us something. We feel a certain glow of emotional virtue, and it is this that we 
receive for our dime. ’ 55 
 The mechanisms inducing joy-of-giving may, however, be less socially desirable 
than emotional virtue. A striving for social recognition is a key psychological driver 
of public consumption, 56 and research by Andreoni and Petri suggests that where 
donors are identifi able, the size of their in-study donation will increase. They fi nd 
that  ‘ by unmasking subjects, we allow for various social effects, like pride, shame, 
social comparison and prestige, to work ’ . 57 A second, and directly intuitive, mecha-
nism to induce a joy-of-giving is found in circumstances where donors are enticed 
by the supply of, or the chance of winning, private material inducements. Landry 
et al show that lottery fund-raising increases the sum of voluntary contributions. 58 
Similarly, in an analysis of records at the English National Opera, Buraschi and 
Cornelli fi nd a class of donors induced to give by special events and gala dinners. 59 
Where there is inducement through the supply of social benefi t or material reward, 
the potential for egoistic joy-of-giving is clear. 
 In economic donative theory, it is consumption of the joy-of-giving which pro-
vides the satisfaction, not material inducements or intangible social rewards per se. 60 
They operate only to indicate circumstances of egoistic consumption of charita-
ble goods. Such egoistic pleasure is not kryptonite to altruism. There is nothing in 
theory to prevent a donor from holding both egoistic and altruistic intentions at 
the same time. In economic donative theory it is common to understand donors 
as existing on a spectrum with  ‘ pure altruism ’ at one end and  ‘ pure egoism ’ at the 
other. Thus, it is possible, in between both ends of the spectrum, to both care about 
charitable ends and simultaneously derive an egoistic joy-of-giving. 61 For example, 
a donor to a charitable lottery might both get a thrill from entry to the draw and 
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genuinely hope her money will go to good causes. Or a relative disinheriting mainly 
from spite might also care about the cats ’ home. 
 However, it is those economic models of donation where individuals are driven by 
nothing other than economic egoism — deriving no utility from charity itself — which 
challenge the law, and, in turn, provide the focus of the following section. 62 This is 
because, as will be seen, an entirely egoistic donor will sit outside of the law ’ s ration-
ale for return. A donor motivated only by egoism will have no concern at all for the 
provision of charitable goods. In turn, her charitable intention cannot be frustrated 
on failure, and there is no need, at law, to give the money back. 
 B. Why Purely Egoistic Gifts Should Be Kept in Charity 
 It has been argued that the law of return is based in frustrated altruism, so its rationale 
does not apply to an egoistic motivation that has not been at all frustrated. Later 
sections will discover instances of unacknowledged egoism in the precedents to 
pinpoint examples of return without any doctrinal basis. Here, however, the appro-
priate legal response to egoistic gift making is plotted. It is argued that purely ego-
istic transfers should continue to be treated as charitable gifts, but that they are 
outside the altruistic and end-driven rationale for return. They should be kept in 
charity. 
 The law is only seriously challenged by purely egoistic donors. Where an 
 individual simultaneously derives a joy-of-giving and also genuinely wishes to mate-
rially advance the lives of others, she can still be scooped up within the legal net of 
altruism. She can, without distorting the truth, be said to be at risk of frustration 
if the altruistic side of her motivational binary cannot be effected. In such circum-
stances, the judicial blind spot to egoism is of conceptual interest, but of no legal 
consequence. It is only where the donor is a pure egoist 63 that the doctrine of return 
is truly challenged. In that circumstance, where a donor is not motivated by altruistic 
outcomes at all, charitable failure cannot frustrate her self-interested intent. 
 It is now possible to go where judges cannot, and map the purely egoistic motiva-
tion on to the law. Lost in a colder world of self-interest, it is initially tempting to 
leave behind charitable precedents and instead take recourse in the law of private 
express trusts. If egoistically motivated gifts were considered non-charitable, this 
would cause their return as a matter of precedent. As is well known, Megarry J 
suggested in  Re Vandervell ’ s Trusts (No 2) 64 that upon failure of a non-charitable 
gift, a resulting trust will occur automatically without any regard at all for intention. 
A later approach is more circumspect, but has similar effect. In  Air Jamaica Ltd 
v Charlton , Lord Millett said of the resulting trust that it  ‘ responds to the absence of 
any intention on his part to pass a benefi cial interest to the recipient ’ . 65 Thus there 
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is a strong, but not irrefutable, 66 precedential presumption of return in most failed 
private express trust cases. 67 
 Yet taking cold comfort in the law of private trusts does not quite wash. Even 
though entirely ego-driven donations are non-altruistic, such gifts cannot without 
strain be classed as legally  ‘ non-charitable ’ . Ego-motivated donors will be aware that 
their gifts were, before failure, destined for a legally recognised charitable end. They 
will expect their gift to go to charity, even if they are unmoved by the prospect. The 
distinction between an ego-driven and an altruistic, outcome-driven donor goes to 
the nature of charitable motivation as it is understood at law, but it does not relate 
to any wider legal taxonomy. It is therefore necessary to look for a way to fi t egoistic 
donors within the law of charitable return. 
 There is no doubt that the altruistic, outcome-driven logic of return does not 
apply in egoistic cases. The legal problem is that while an egoistic donor will be 
unconcerned with altruistic charitable ends, the law of return assumes their central 
importance. We have seen that courts treat donors as altruists, and that they return 
gifts in consequence of irredeemably frustrated altruistic goals. In consequence, the 
fi rst reason not to return in cases of egoistic donation is simply that such donors are 
outside this rationale of the law. An egoistic donor has suffered no frustration of 
her altruistic plans. Despite the failure of her gift, she remains content because she 
derived egoistic satisfaction from the process of giving. For example, in  New Forest 
Agricultural Show Society v The Commissioners of Customs and Excise , Nicol J 
described, in relation to fundraising, such a joy-driven enterprise as  ‘ a function held 
in a vicarage or possibly manor garden (in the church hall if wet) ’ , including enjoy-
ably social, yet profi table, competition, such as  ‘ guessing the length of a phenom-
enally large runner bean or the weight of a huge fruit cake, with a fee payable for 
each guess ’ . 68 Donors sampling such bucolic and personally profi table pleasures will 
have been satisfi ed at the point of giving. It would be wrong to call them frustrated 
altruists in any sense. 
 Alongside the negative reason not to return, there is also a second positive legal 
reason to keep egoistic gifts in charity. While an egoistic donor is evidently not moti-
vated in the altruistic sense that she desires to see charitable outcomes, her gift is still 
a product of rational choice. She will expect it to go to charity, regardless of being 
unmoved by the prospect. She has therefore a type of legal expectation for the law to 
grasp a hold of. It must be conceded, however, that the grip is weak. Merely effecting 
what the donor can be said to have expected lacks the same legal normative force 
as carrying through what the donor positively wished, but in circumstances where 
there is no frustration at all, keeping the gift in charity remains a legal effectuation 
of her decision to give. While a tombola player, motivated by the chance of winning 
a prize, will not in truth be concerned about the state of the church roof, she will in 
a weak sense expect the gift to be applied to legal charity. Although that is not the 
motivation, it is the incidental expectation. 
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 Such a legal outcome — keeping purely egoistic gifts in charity — is, at root, intui-
tive. The altruistic donor ’ s gift, if she was concerned with charitable outcomes, has 
truly failed. Her altruism is frustrated, and she is in a parallel position to a purchaser 
of unobtainable goods. By contrast, an egoistic donor will have been self-interest-
edly satisfi ed regardless of the failure. Following from her successful and contented 
consumption of joy-of-giving, she cannot also expect her money back. 
 V. RETURN WITHOUT A RATIONALE IN CONTEXTS 
OF PURE EGOISM 
 It has been argued that the rationale for return rests on a legal understanding of 
donors as irredeemably frustrated economic altruists. It has also been argued that 
when purely egoistic gifts are found, the courts should not return them. It will now 
be argued that, in the context of failed testamentary gifts and failed public appeals, 
the blind spot to egoism causes fundamental doctrinal problems. 
 A.  Return without a Rationale: Purely Egoistic Motivation 
in the Testamentary Context 
 Egoism is present but not prevalent in testamentary giving, so while the existing 
framework of return falls into conceptual diffi culty in egoistic cases, such instances 
of egoistic donation are infrequent enough to leave the system of testamentary con-
struction as a whole unscathed. This section criticises the courts ’ approach to egois-
tic motivation where it arises, but concludes with an acknowledgment of the broadly 
altruistic nature of testamentary charity. 
 A fi rst instance of purely egoistic donation in testamentary cases — gifts motivated 
by spite — graphically illustrates problems with existing rules which assume altru-
ism. This is a most unfortunate joy-of-giving. Testamentary gifts to charity may 
disappoint survivors, and exclusion of hopeful recipients through a gift to charity, 
might induce a utilitarian joy akin to Bentham ’ s  ‘ pleasures resulting from the view 
of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings who may become the objects of 
malevolence ’ . 69 Spiteful testamentary donors will give without concern for charita-
ble ends, directing funds to charity in a far more malign frame of mind. The will in 
 Mills v Farmer shows a striking but rare example of open hostility. In the case, a 
testamentary donor partly disinherited his kin. He stated in his will that he would 
later name charitable objects, but he did not do so, leaving the court confronted 
with the vaguest of intentions. His testamentary papers included the telling direc-
tion:  ‘ It is needless to have any of my relations attend my funeral, as it is apt to breed 
ill will amongst them; and their grief on such occasions, is generally attended with 
hypocrisy. ’ 70 
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 In  Mills v Farmer , the donor ’ s motivational enmity was presumably confi ned to 
his family. Yet in one remarkable instance,  Re Satterthwaite ’ s Will Trusts , 71 a donor 
was apparently motivated by her dislike of all humanity. Telling a bank offi cial that 
she hated all human beings, the donor declared that she would leave everything to 
animals. She presented the bank offi cial with a will written on brown paper but, 
after being advised to create a formal will, the donor then requested he compile a 
list of animal charities. With further insouciance to charitable outcomes, the gift was 
made by reference to the London classifi ed telephone directory. 
 The altruistic framework of return cannot be coherently applied in such cases. 
They are outside its rationale and, as it has been argued, such gifts are best kept in 
charity. A court of construction searching for irredeemably frustrated altruism, pre-
pared to return the gift where such altruism is found, misfi res its precedents. Where 
donors are exclusively consuming joy-of-giving, charitable ends do not matter to 
them at all, and so the test for a general or a particular charitable intention has no 
traction. The law ’ s inability to recognise purely egoistic giving causes it a conceptual 
problem: it forces the courts to look for an altruistic motivation which might not 
be there, and possibly to effect return without any reason for doing so. There is no 
frustrated altruism in these cases. The donors — being dead at the point of failure —
 have already consumed an egoistic joy-of-giving in life. However, the law is unable 
to recognise that state of mind. Without a theory of egoistic donation in its tool kit, 
it is not open for the courts to fi nd that any altruistic charitable end was incidental 
to the gift. Instead, in each case, following the standard approach, the court looks 
incoherently for irredeemably frustrated altruism. 
 A second instance of purely egoistic donation in testamentary cases — a desire to 
create a personal memorial 72 — provides a direct example of return without a legal 
rationale. In the Victorian case  Re Gwilym , a donor hoped for the  ‘ Gwilym Art 
 Gallery and Museum ’ to be opened in her own house after death. However, she 
did not leave enough money for the plan, causing the gift to fail. Smith J noted 
her motivation directly, stating,  ‘ as appears from the direction that her name is to 
be attached to the museum and art gallery, she desired to establish a permanent 
memorial to herself ’ . 73 On the application of ordinary principles, Smith J apparently 
found a particular charitable intention, returning the gift to her testamentary estate. 
Such an outcome is incoherent, but inevitable, in a system of construction that does 
not recognise egoistic giving. Smith J was forced to discover, despite clear facts, an 
irredeemably frustrated concern for the benefi t of others. This is a failure of the 
law, rather than a failure of the judge. It was simply not possible, within the exist-
ing legal framework, to fi nd that the donor had before death successfully consumed 
joy-of-giving in contemplation of her self-interested goals. 
 This conceptual legal problem is a limited one because it impacts on only a 
relatively small number of cases. Although pure egoism in the form of spite and 
vanity can be inferred in the case reports, such instances are striking because they 
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are  unusual. While testamentary donors, giving in contemplation of death, 74 might 
be motivated by  ‘ legacy ’ , it is a generally altruistic inheritance that they have in 
mind. In an interview-based investigation into the meaning of  ‘ legacy ’ in the context 
of aging, Hunter and Rowles identify three types:  ‘ material ’ ,  ‘ biological ’ and  ‘ of 
values ’ . 75 For those authors, the ends to which property is devoted appears 
important; participants in their study suggested that it is the third element — the 
transmission of values — which holds the most salience. They state in later work 
that  ‘ a primary task in creating a legacy is determining the values we cherish most 
in life and conveying these values to our descendants and to our communities ’ . 76 In 
another parallel to our legal understanding of end-driven altruism, Wade-Benzoni et 
al suggest that legacies allow donors to  ‘ form a psychological bond with others in 
the future, thereby symbolically extending themselves into the future and helping to 
fulfi l their desires to establish a positive legacy ’ . 77 While the personality of testamen-
tary donors is undoubtedly wrapped up in their legacy, an end-driven and altruistic 
drive is likely to be present. 
 Altruism is also more commonly inferred in the case reports than spite and vanity. 
For example, gifts are often directed at social change and, where this is the case, it 
must be likely that altruistic contemplation of the future will motivate the gift. His-
torically there have been gifts to reform prisons 78 or to abolish slavery, 79 and more 
recently gifts for animal welfare have appeared in the reports, 80 alongside gifts for 
the promotion of peace. 81 Gifts are also often marked by a local fl avour, suggesting a 
desire to confer genuine benefi t upon a particular community. Gifts to local churches 
are relatively common, 82 such as in  Re Broadbent , 83 where a bequest was left to 
a closed iron-framed mission church in Stalybridge. Community links can also be 
seen, such as in  Re Sanders ’ Will Trusts , where a gift was left to the working classes, 
 preferably dockers working in the Pembroke Docks, 84 and also in  Re Bagshaw , 85 
where a testamentary donor left a gift to the Bakewell and District War  Memorial 
Cottage Hospital, which treated patients within a radius of fi ve miles from the 
Bakewell Memorial Cross. Localised gifts suggest a genuine community end. 
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 In testamentary cases, the altruistic framework for return falters on occasion, but 
it is tested only rarely. It is true that where egoistic motivation is obviously present, 
such as in cases of spite or vanity, the law of return falls into a conceptual incoher-
ence. There is no frustration of altruistic intention, and it is argued that such gifts, 
being successful instances of egoistic consumption outside the rationale of return, 
should be kept in charity. Yet being beyond the paradigm case of testamentary 
altruism, they rarely trouble the courts. 
 B.  Return without a Rationale: Purely Egoistic Motivation 
in the Public Appeals Context 
 Failed appeals are a relatively new legal problem in the precedents. The law of return 
developed over a long period of time in the context of wills, 86 yet failed appeals 
emerged as a persistent legal issue only in the twentieth century. 87 Their emer-
gence followed both a wider diffusion of surplus wealth throughout society and the 
 establishment of professional fund-raising practices. 88 A shift to the mass funding of 
charity was heralded by Beveridge in  Voluntary Action by his optimistic statement 
that  ‘ the democracy can and should learn to do what used to be done for the public 
good by the wealthy ’ . 89 
 Appeals often combine Beveridge ’ s democratic virtue with self-interest. 90 Instances 
of purely egoistic donation will be identifi ed from the case law. These are gifts made 
in return for a personal material reward and gifts made in pursuit of a social ben-
efi t, such as public prestige. While the law has developed a coherent response to 
material benefi t, it fl ounders with regard to gifts made in socially advantageous 
contexts. 
 A fi rst instance of public appeal donation — gifts motivated by a desire to receive 
a personal material benefi t — is purely egoistic. Where donors are induced to pay 
into charity by the prospect of a personal reward, there is clear-cut joy-of-giving. 
There is also no incoherence to be found in the case law. There is no question of 
return. For example, if a contributor to a charitable campaign is motivated to receive 
concert tickets, publications or the chance to enter for prizes, she will be treated as 
having parted entirely with her money and so denied a right to return. In  Re West 
Sussex Constabulary ’ s Widows, Children and Benevolent Fund , a case concerning 
contributions to a non-charitable pension and dependent relative fund, Goff J stated, 
after detailed consideration of the charitable case law, that the motivation was con-
tractual:  ‘ The purchaser of a ticket may have the motive of aiding the cause or he 
may not; he may purchase a ticket merely because he wishes to attend the particular 
entertainment or to try for the prize. ’ 91 
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 Although the courts are not equipped with a theory of egoistic donation, 
Goff J ’ s statement comes startlingly close. It parallels the logic of economic analysis. 
The judge, who makes a distinction between outcome-driven gifts and those fl owing 
from a joy-of-giving, shares its rationale. That is, if a donor is entirely motivated by 
such non-altruistic enjoyment as concert tickets, sweepstakes and lotteries, it is inco-
herent to look for irredeemable frustration of an intended altruistic outcome. In the 
case, Goff J stated:  ‘ it appears to me to be impossible to apply the doctrine of result-
ing trust ’ . 92 Similarly, in  Re British School of Egyptian Archaeology , 93 subscribers 
to an educational archaeological society were held to be motivated by the receipt of 
handsomely produced academic research publications. Finding a contractual rela-
tionship with the charity, Harman J prevented a return. So in this instance of pure 
egoism, the law is both settled and clear: such gifts are kept in charity. 
 By contrast, a second instance of purely egoistic donation — gifts prompted by a 
social reward — is met without such clarity. Where gifts are made out of a drive for 
social benefi t or prestige, they are analogous to an egoistic exchange for material 
reward. Yet this is not recognised by the law. By way of example, a paradigm cir-
cumstance of gifts made for social benefi t is found at charity auctions, where donors 
are prompted to bid excessively in order to gain social recognition. 94 Circumstances 
of social reward are not always so cut-throat or dramatic. A donor might derive a 
social benefi t from smaller-scale social interactions, 95 such as a collection amongst 
colleagues in a work place. Where the gift is motivated exclusively by a self-interested 
goal, the charitable end will be incidental to the decision to give. The motivation 
will be egoistic and not altruistic. 
 The issue of egoistic social benefi t has surfaced — albeit obliquely — in three 
cases involving community fund-raising for hospitals:  Re Welsh Hospital (Netley) 
Fund , 96  Re Hillier ’ s Trusts 97 and  Re Ulverston and District New Hospital Building 
Trusts . 98 Unfortunately, no clear legal principle has emerged from repeated litiga-
tion. Taking the three cases together, it can be seen that certain judges have held that 
gifts made in contexts of social benefi t should uniformly be kept in charity, 99 but 
others have expressed a preference for return. So in  Welsh Hospital , PO Lawrence J 
expressed, with reference to social fund-raising, a very strong view that return 
would be  ‘ absurd on the face of it ’ . 100 In that case, funds had been raised, inter alia, 
 ‘ from collections in streets and at churches  … in most of the towns and  villages 
of Wales ’ . 101 Lord Denning picked up the mantle in  Hillier ’ s , stressing the loss of 
a right to return for appeals in social contexts. The judge held that gifts raised 
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at  ‘ a church collection, a fl ag day, a whist drive, a dance, or some such activity ’ are 
given  ‘ beyond recall ’ . 102 
 Yet at least two judges have countenanced the possibility of return with regard to 
funds raised in contexts of social benefi t. So in  Ulverston , Jenkins LJ stated  obiter 
that if a person had, in the context of solicitation, put money into a collection box 
and could satisfy the court that he had done so, then he  ‘ should  … be entitled to have 
his money back in the event of the failure. 103 And in  Hillier ’ s , Romer J stated, in a 
dissenting judgment, that any donor,  ‘ whether large or small ’ , 104 should be entitled 
to a return in principle. This approach leaves the door wide open for the return of 
egoistic gifts, but supplies no rationale for doing so. 
 In contrast to testamentary donation, egoism is much closer to the paradigm in 
the context of appeals. In the context of gifts for material benefi t (eg lotteries and 
prizes), the courts have come very close to recognising that fact. However, where 
there is a purely egoistic social benefi t derived from a public appeal, return is just 
as inappropriate. But the courts, without a fully articulated theory of egoistic 
motivation, have been unable to clearly express this view. 
 VI. A CONCEPTUAL STICKING-PLASTER: REFORM 
OF PUBLIC APPEALS 
 In the preceding section it was argued that judges erroneously return purely egoistic 
gifts without a legal rationale for doing so in both testamentary and appeals contexts. 
In an ironic twist, targeted legislative reform prevents return, but without a satisfac-
tory rationale for the change. Bereft of a theoretical underpinning, statute — directed 
at public appeals — turns the problem on its head. That is, return is prevented as a 
result of the statute, but the legal basis for doing so is theoretically fl awed. 
 The key reform concerns gifts made by unidentifi able 105 and unknown 106 donors. 
Under section 64 of the Charities Act 2011, these donors are defi ned inter alia as 
those giving through a collection box, lottery, competition or sale. 107 They are auto-
matically and conclusively presumed to have a general charitable intention, 108 with 
the effect that return is precluded. 109 
 The micro-level economic perspective uncovers a conceptual problem: the statu-
tory provisions sweep egoists under an altruistic carpet. It will be remembered that 
the general charitable intention is a form of broad and permissive altruism; it is the 
fl exible and altruistic state of mind that permits judges to keep gifts in charity. It is 
also clear that collection box, lottery, sale and competition donors are likely to be 
deriving either a social or material benefi t from giving. They are most likely egoistic. 
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While keeping their gifts in charity accords with the argument in this chapter — that 
egoistic gifts should not be returned — fi xing such egoistic donors with a statutorily 
presumed general altruism is conceptually fl awed. 
 The legislative reform to the law of public appeals was administratively, and not 
theoretically, driven. So at the House of Lords Committee stage in relation to precur-
sor legislation, 110 Lord Silkin straightforwardly presented the view that the cases on 
appeals, insofar as they contradict or turn upon hair-splitting, 111 should be rational-
ised. Only Lord Denning, sitting in a legislative capacity, hinted at deeper theoretical 
issues, stating that  ‘ in a public appeal of this kind I would submit to your Lordships 
that a person gives his money and that that is the end of it, he does not expect to 
have it back ’ . 112 
 The sensible administrative reform impulse behind the legislation can be forgiven. 
Return of gifts to unidentifi able donors is an impossibility, and so conclusively fi xing 
them with a general charitable intention permits the courts to take the prudent step 
of defi nitively ruling out such implausible action. However, without a clear grasp 
of the relationship between donor motivation and the precedents, the law can be 
seen to have tied itself in a conceptual knot. It applies a model of outcome-driven 
altruistic intention — the general charitable intention — to a category of donors very 
likely to be egoistically consuming the joy-of-giving. 
 The conceptual problem manifests itself in real-world legal artifi ciality. So, on 
occasion, intuitively egoistic donors have been conclusively presumed to have an 
altruistic general charitable intention. For example, in  ‘ South Scarborough Swim-
ming Pool Association ’ , 113 the Charity Commission for England and Wales deployed 
the statutory power in relation to an underfunded swimming bath appeal, 114 noting 
that part of the fund was raised by  ‘ dances, social evenings, sponsored events ’ . 115 
Deploying the statute, a general charitable intention was found, permitting the gift 
to be used for the benefi t of the local area. Yet in the context of dances and social 
evenings, it seems far more likely that the donors were entirely motivated by joy-of-
giving. 116 The statute fi xed the donors with a type of altruistic intention that they 
did not hold. 
 The statute, as it relates to unidentifi able donors, is a sticking plaster over a 
theoretical sore. From the economic perspective worked through in this chapter, 
it can be seen that the reason that egoistic donors should receive no return is that 
they have suffered no frustration; they have contentedly and successfully consumed 
a joy-of-giving. Instead, the legislation treats them as general altruists. The statute 
pushes the court to the right conclusion — keeping the gifts in charity — but by the 
wrong route. Without recognition of egoistic donation, and acknowledgement that 
such intention is outside the rationale of return, the conceptual sore is left to fester. 
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 VII. CONCLUSION 
 Application of economic donative theory has uncovered the judicial rationale for 
return. The core point of the analysis is that the law treats donors as altruistic in the 
economic sense. Judges assume that donors care, and care deeply, about the delivery 
of material outcomes to others. In turn, this leads to the legal rationale for return. It 
is because the donor is thought to be giving in pursuit of genuinely desired charitable 
outcomes that, where those outcomes cannot be delivered, courts will return gifts 
with an apology note. Economic donative theory has shown that the rationale for 
return lies in an assumption of frustrated economic altruism. 
 Economic donative theory is a critical as well as an explanatory tool. It shows, as 
a legal conceptual problem, that the courts have no understanding of egoism. Judges, 
at the level of principle, are only able to proceed on the basis that the gift before 
them has been made in the spirit of economic altruism. This leads to a fundamental 
strain. Where a donor is motivated by a purely egoistic joy-of-giving, it makes no 
sense to ask whether or not her goals have been frustrated. She is happy regardless. 
If her true motivation was spite to family, entry into a lottery or the accrual of social 
esteem, then she will not care what the judge does with her gift upon its incidental 
failure. 
 These theoretical problems run deep, unsettling the doctrine once they are ana-
lysed. It is unsurprising that the sole attempt at legislative reform — in the context 
of public appeals — has been shown to founder. Without legal recognition of egoistic 
giving, both case law and statute will inevitably tie themselves in knots. To iron 
them out, the courts should start by acknowledging the existence of egoistic gifts 
and, in consequence, keep those gifts in charity on the basis that such self-interested 
motivation is outside the legal rationale of the doctrine. 
 
 
